Right of Redemption

The following observation has been made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, with respect to the right of redemption in the case of Jamila Begum (D) thr. L.Rs. vs. Shami Mohd. (D) thr. L.Rs. and Ors. MANU/SC/1488/2018

“The right of redemption can be extinguished as provided in proviso to Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. It can be extinguished either by the act of the parties or by decree of a court. The expression “act of parties” refers to some transaction subsequent to the mortgage, standing barred from the mortgage transaction. As discussed earlier, in this case Jamila Begum-one of the mortgagees has purchased the property by the sale deed dated 21.12.1970 and thus, she purchased the entire equity of redemption by the execution of the sale deed, the mortgage qua the Appellant has merged with the sale.”

Interpretation of Section 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act

The Supreme Court in the recent judgment of Vidya Drolia and Ors. vs. Durga Trading Corporation and Ors.  MANU/SC/0939/2020 has interpreted Section 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act as follows:-

“a. Sections 8 and 11 of the Act have the same ambit with respect to judicial interference.

b.Usually, subject matter arbitrability cannot be decided at the stage of Sections 8 or 11 of the Act, unless it’s a clear case of deadwood.

c. The Court, Under Sections 8 and 11, has to refer a matter to arbitration or to appoint an arbitrator, as the case may be, unless a party has established a prima facie (summary findings) case of non-existence of valid arbitration agreement, by summarily portraying a strong case that he is entitled to such a finding.

d. The Court should refer a matter if the validity of the arbitration agreement cannot be determined on a prima facie basis, as laid down above, i.e., ‘when in doubt, do refer’.

e. The scope of the Court to examine the prima facie validity of an arbitration agreement includes only:

a. Whether the arbitration agreement was in writing? or

b. Whether the arbitration agreement was contained in exchange of letters, telecommunication etc?

c. Whether the core contractual ingredients qua the arbitration agreement were fulfilled?

d. On rare occasions, whether the subject-matter of dispute is arbitrable?”

Assessing Evidence in Criminal Trials

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently reiterated that while adjudicating criminal cases ocular evidence is the best form of evidence, in the matter of Pruthiviraj Jayantibhai Vanol vs. Dinesh Dayabhai Vala and Ors. (26.07.2021 – SC) : MANU/SC/0475/2021

“Ocular evidence is considered the best evidence unless there are reasons to doubt it. The evidence of PW-2 and PW-10 is unimpeachable. It is only in a case where there is a gross contradiction between medical evidence and oral evidence, and the medical evidence makes the ocular testimony improbable and Rules out all possibility of ocular evidence being true, the ocular evidence may be disbelieved. In the present case, we find no inconsistency between the ocular and medical evidence. The High Court grossly erred in appreciation of evidence by holding that muddamal No. 5 was a simple iron rod without noticing the evidence that it had a sharp turn edge.”

Cancellation of Bail

While upholding the independence of judiciary and the need for separation of powers the Hon’ble Supreme Court corrected the erroneous approach of the High Court and held that in the case of  Somesh Chaurasia vs. State of M.P. and Ors. MANU/SC/0466/2021 bail should have been cancelled:-

“The High Court mis-applied itself to the legal principles which must govern such a case. The serious error by the High Court in its impugned order can be considered from two perspectives. First, the High Court by simply disposing of the IAs seeking cancellation of bail ignored material considerations which ought to have weighed in the decision. Some of the events which we have narrated above have undoubtedly transpired after the order of the High Court. However, taking the position as it stood when the High Court considered the issue, a clear case for cancellation of bail was established. The second aspect which is also of significance is the impact of the order of the High Court. The High Court was apprised of the fact that FIR No. 143 of 2019 had been lodged against the second Respondent. The investigation into the FIR had to proceed according to law. Instead, the High Court gave a period of ninety days to the police to enquire into the complaint of the second Respondent that he was being targeted and allowed the police to thereafter proceed in accordance with law. This order had the effect of obstructing a fair investigation into the FIR at the behest of the Accused despite the nature and gravity of the allegations against him. The events which have transpired since go to emphasize the fact that the High Court was in grievous error in passing its directions which were misused to defeat the investigation. The police submitted a closure report absolving the second Respondent. Thereafter, despite the order Under Section 319, the second Respondent evaded arrested in contravention of the warrant of arrest which was issued by the ASJ. The facts which have been narrated in the earlier part of this judgment indicate that the police have been complicit in shielding the second Respondent. The criminal antecedents of the second Respondent and the prior conviction on a charge of murder have been adverted to earlier. The second Respondent, whose spouse is an MLA was provided security by the State. The DGP was sanguine in informing this Court that the second Respondent could not be arrested despite the directions issued by this Court. It was only after this Court issued a peremptory direction indicating recourse to the coercive arm of law that the second Respondent was arrested, ostensibly from a bus-stand. The material on the record indicates that an effort has been made to shield the Accused from the administration of criminal justice. The apprehensions expressed by the ASJ in his order dated 8 February 2021 of the machinations of a highly influential Accused evading the process of law are amply borne out by the facts which have been revealed before this Court. There is no reasonable basis to doubt the anguish and concern of a judicial officer. That the state did not oppose the application Under Section 319 is a feeble attempt to justify the inaction of the police. Unfortunately, the High Court failed in its duty to ensure that the sanctity of the criminal justice process is preserved. This Court has had to step in to ensure that the Rule of law is preserved.”